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SECONDARY BOYCOTTS UNDER THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
PHILIP HORNBEIN, JR.

of the Denver Bar

The distinctive feature of a secondary boycott is that it is
directed against a neutral party rather than against the employer
directly involved in the labor dispute. The target of the secondary
boycott is a third party who is engaged in business dealings with
the employer as a customer, supplier, or otherwise. The object
of the secondary boycott is to cause the boycottee to cease doing
business with the employer. The secondary boycott may take the
form of a withholding of either patronage or labor from the boycottee. The withholding of labor may consist of an all-out strike
but is usually confined to a more limited form of work stoppage.
Even before the enactment of recent state and federal legislation restricting labor union activity, the courts were generally
agreed that the secondary boycott was not a permissible weapon
in labor disputes. The courts held that it was contrary to public
policy "to allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode
to conscript neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or
the industry in which it arose." I However, "the economic contest between employer and employee has never concerned merely
the immediate disputants." 2 In every labor dispute, disinterested
persons are affected in one way or another. Almost every strike
will necessarily have an effect upon the operations of customers
and suppliers of the struck employer.
But such indirect repercussions do not convert a primary
strike into illegal secondary activity. It is only where the thrust
of the union activity is aimed directly against the neutral party
that it becomes an unlawful secondary boycott. It is not always
easy to distinguish between the two types of activity. Because
of the complex relationships in our industrial and commercial systems, many border line cases arise which present considerable difficulty to the courts.
Neither federal nor state statutes afford any clear-cut test
for drawing the line between lawful primary activity and unlawful
secondary activity.
The Taft-Hartley law 3 does not restrict secondary boycotts
which take the form of a withholding of patronage. It is only

I Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 728, 62 S.
Ct. 807, 810, in which it was held that an injunction against picketing did not invade any constitutional right where the picketing was directed against a restaurant, the owner of which had engaged a contractor employing non-union
labor to construct a building a mile and one-half away from the restaurant.
2

Ibid, 315 U. S. 724, 62 S. Ct. 808.

'29

U.S.C.A., sec. 141, et seq.
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secondary strikes or work stoppages which fall under the ban of
the federal law. Sec. 8 (b) (4) (A) 4 of the Act makes it an unfair
labor practice "to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike, or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise. handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services,
where an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring . . . any
employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person . . . ". If this section were applied according
to its literal meaning, no strike would be lawful since an object
of every strike is to shut down the employer's operations which
would necessarily force him to "cease doing business" with other
persons. However, the federal courts have quite properly given
little heed to the literal terms of the statute, and have based their
decisions more on the historic concepts of secondary boycotts.
On June 4, 1951, the United States Supreme Court handed
down decisions in four cases 5 involving alleged unlawful secondary boycotts under the Taft-Hartley law.
The first of these cases 6 concerned the picketing of a grain
mill by a union which did not represent a majority of the employees of the mill. The object of the picketing was to gain recognition of the union as bargaining representative of the employees.
The basis of the complaint against the union was an incident
which occurred when a customer's truck, manned by two employees of the customer, approached the mill to pick up a load of
grain. The pickets sought to dissuade the truckers from carrying
out their assignment and to this end they not only employed
rhetoric, but also threw stones at the truck, all to no avail.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held that an
unfair labor practice had been committed by the union in "attempting to induce and encourage the employees of the neutral
[customer] to refuse to transport . . . the commodities of the
rice mill." 7 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conduct of the union pickets was not covered by Sec. 8 (b) (4) (A) for
two reasons: (1) The picketing was confined to the "geographically restricted area near the mill," and (2) its purpose was not
to induce concerted action by the employees of the neutral employer. In the words of the court, "a union's inducements or encouragements reaching individual employees of neutral employers
U.S.C.A., sec. 158(b) (4) (A).
SN.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Company, 341 U. S. 665, 71 S. Ct.
961; N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S.
675, 71 S. Ct. 943; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B.,
341 U. S. 694, 71 S. Ct. 954; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America v. N.L.R.B., 341 U. S. 707, 71 S. Ct. 966.
6
N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Company, supra, n. 5.
7 183 Fed. 2d 21, 26.
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only as they happen to approach the picketed place of business
generally are not aimed at concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by such employees." 8 The court said that the fact
that the picketing was restricted to the vicinity of the mill "is
significant, although not necessarily conclusive." 9
Since the Rice Milling case, a number of decisions by the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts have definitely
established that picketing at the premises of the primary employer
is legal even though it may cause employees of neutral employers
to refuse to perform services for their employers. 10 The United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, construed the Rice Milling decision "to mean. that a union may lawfully inflict harm on
a neutral employer, without violating Sec. 8(b) (4), so long as
the harm is merely incidental to a traditionally lawful primary
strike, conducted at the place where the primary employer does
business." 1
But in many cases the employer's operations are mobile, and
the question then arises whether the union may extend its picketing to places remote from the employer's premises. In some industries, the very nature of the employer's business makes it impossible or ineffective to picket the premises of the employer. For
example, in the construction industry, the employer's principal
operations are not conducted in any -central location, but are carried on at numerous project sites. To picket the office or shop of
the contractor would have little effect on his operations. For this
reason, the picketing is usually carried on at the site of the construction work. But in almost every case there are a number of
other contractors also working on the same job, and it is this
situation which gives rise to some of the most difficult problems
under Sec. 8 (b) (4) (A).
On the same day the Supreme Court handed down the'decision in the Rice Milling case, decisions were rendered in three
cases involving picketing in the building and construction industry. In the Denver Building Trades Council case,' 2 the union had
picketed a building project. The general contractor employed
union workers, but one of the sub-contractors employed non-union
workers. The court held the picketing unlawful on the ground
that its object was to force the general contractor to terminate
the contract of the sub-contractor. In the Electrical Workers case, 3
the fact situation was similar to that of the Denver case, and the
court rendered a like decision. However, there is some illuminating language in the opinion of the court which indicates that if
341 U. S. 671, 71 S. Ct. 964.
'341 U. S. 671, 71 S. Ct. 964.
"Pure Oil case, 84 N.L.R.B. No. 38; Ryan Construction Corporation case,
85 N.L.R.B. No. 76; N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen and Helpers Union. (C.A.-2) 191 Fed. (2d) 65.
"341 U. S. 675, 71 S. Ct. 943.
12341 U. S. 694, 71 S. Ct. 954.
U. S. 699, 700, 71 S. Ct. 957.
13341
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the union had proceeded in a slightly different manner, the picketing would have been permissible. The court points out that the
union had made no demands upon the sub-contractor in connection
with the particular project which was picketed. The court further
pointed out:
There are no findings that the picketing was aimed
at Langer [the electrical sub-contractor] to force him
to employ union workmen on this job. On the contrary,
the findings demonstrate that the picketing' was directed
at Deltorto's [the carpentry sub-contractor] employees to
induce them to strike and thus force Deltorto to force
the general 14
contractor to terminate Langer's electrical
sub-contract.
Presumably, if the union had made a demand upon the electrical sub-contractor that he employ union workers on his job,
and had re-worded its picket sign to show that it was directed
against the sub-contractor rather than the general contractor,
there would have been no unfair labor practice.
It is very probable that the practical effect of the picketing
would have been the same if the union had proceeded as suggested
by the court. As it was, the union workers walked off the job
when it was picketed and the general contractor thereupon terminated the contract of the electrical sub-contractor. All this no
doubt would have happened even though the union had followed
the procedure indicated by the court. From this it might seem
that the distinction made by the court is without substance. But
it must be kept in mind that under the provisions of the statute,
picketing is lawful or unlawful depending upon its "object.'' It
is not the effect of the union activity which determines its legality,
but its purpose. What purpose motivates any particular conduct
is always a matter which must be inferred from the circumstances
of the particular case. It may reasonably be expected therefore
that a slight difference in the facts of two cases may produce
divergent results.
In cases involving "roving" picketing, the problem of distinguishing between primary and secondary activity is even more
difficult. The Board has recognized that "in some cases the situs
of the dispute may not be limited to a fixed location; it may be
ambulatory." I In the Schultz Refrigerator Service case 16 the
Board held that the truck upon which a truck driver worked was
the situs of a labor dispute between him and the owner of the
truck. Accordingly, the union to which the driver belonged had
the right to picket the employer's trucks on the premises of the
employer's customers.
In the Moore Dry Dock case 17 the Board formulated a set of
14341

U. S. 699, 700, 71 S. Ct. 957.
"Moore Dry Dock case, 92 N.L.R.B. No. 93.
87 N.L.R.B. No. 82.
"Supra, n. 15.
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tests to determine the legality of picketing away from the premises of the primary employer. Under this decision, picketing at
the premises of a neutral employer is permissible if it meets the
following conditions:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when
the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employer's
premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary
employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs;
(c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to
the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses
clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer.
These criteria were accepted by the United States Court of Ap-8
peals for the Second Circuit in theService Trade Chauffeurs case.'
All of the cases cited involved some type of work stoppage.
Where the purpose of the picket is to bring about a withholding
of patronage rather than a work stoppage, it would not have to
meet the standards adopted by the Board, since it is only picketing to induce a concerted work stoppage that is restricted by the
Taft-Hartley law. The standards adopted by the Board in the
Moore Dry Dobk case seem to be inconsistent with the position
taken by the Board in the building and construction cases. 19
It is significant that in few of the cases involving alleged
secondary boycotts is the neutral employer the complaining party.
Most of the cases originate upon the complaint of the primary
employer with whom the union is directly engaged in a dispute.
It would seem that the identity of the complaining party should
be given considerable weight in determining whether the thrust
of the union activity is directed against a disinterested bystander
or against the primary employer.
It is unlikely that any workable test or rule will ever be
formulated to clearly mark the dividing line between primary and
secondary union conduct. The most the courts can do is to "reconcile the competing claims of unions to strike and of bystanders
to be free of harm from so-called 'secondary boycotts.' " 20

LITERATE LAWYERS PLEASE NOTE
The editors of Dicta attempt to fill forty pages of each issue
with material which is of interest to Colorado lawyers. This is
frequently a difficult task since we are dependent upon our readers
for contributions of the articles or items used and lawyers are
prone to be too modest of their literary prowess. One need only
be literate to transcribe for his fellow lawyers and posterity in
Dicta anecdotes, amusing incidents and other items of interest.
Many briefs which lawyers prepare on Colorado law would make
excellent articles for Dicta. Contributions are always solicited.
"Supra, n. 10.
19Supra, n. 5.
2 N.L.R.B. v. Service
Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen and Helpers Union,
(C.A.-2) 191 Fed. 2d 65.

